I found these similar phrases (bolded by me) in an article [1] and am wondering how they can make sense.
Ordinary human beings are conscious. That is, there is something it
is like to be us. We have conscious experiences with a subjective
character: there is something it is like to see, to hear, to feel,
and to think. […] More broadly, a complete physical description of a
system such as a mouse does not appear to tell us what it is like to
be a mouse, and indeed whether there is anything it is like to be a
mouse.
Now, the meaning the expression conveys is rather straightforward — it is the formulation I have questions about.
Can anyone explain this? Is the form even grammatically correct?
[1] Chalmers, D. (2010). "The Singularity: A Philosophical Analysis." Journal of Consciousness Studies 17:7-65.
Best Answer
This construction is grammatical, but awkward.
In other words, [to be us] is like [something], as opposed to to be us is like nothing (= being us is meaningless). The relative clause [that] it is like to be us has as its antecedent something. The use of like is the same as in please tell me what it is like to be a bat.
Another way to rephrase this while keeping the relative clause is: there is something that "to be us" is like. Both in this form and in the original, that is governed by the adjective-preposition like.
Note that dummy/appositive it is often used to replace an infinitive phrase (an infinitive with arguments) when the infinitive phrase is the subject: this is what it means to be conscious. In relative clauses, this it is even more common, as even simple infinitives are somehow felt to be awkward when they would precede the finite verb; we wouldn't write *this is what to be conscious means. We would either use dummy it, or replace the infinitive with a gerund: this is what being conscious means.
In philosophy of mind, this phrase has unfortunately become popular. A different phrase would have been more transparent and easier to parse, such as:
Or: